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overcome a presumption that: the purported will v,a procured -
the undue influence ~u. Linda Cameron? 
~ase No. 86032 
5. Even if the document dated 1 May 1985 is the 
valid will of the decedent, is Robert Lee Jones entitled to 
inherit as a pretermitted child under Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-302 
(Repl. Vol. 1978)? 
6. Does the language contained in the 1 May 1985 
document drafted by Linda Cameron demonstrate the intent of the 
decedent to disinherit his son, Robert Lee Jones? 
7. Did the trial court err in admitting extrinsic 
evidence for the purpose of overcoming the presumption against 
disinheritance created by Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-302(1)(a)? 
8. Did Herbert Lee Jones devise substantially all of 
his estate to or for the exclusive benefit of the mother of 
Petitioner Robert Jones or did he provide for his son by other 
transfer? 
9. Did the lower court err in finding that the 
purported will was signed as a will and that it was not altered 
after May 1, 1985? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal from the Formal Probate of Will and 
Appointment of Personal Representative entered on April 15, 
1986, by the Third Judicial District Court for the District of 
Utah, the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, presiding. The Formal 
Probate of Will has the effect of excluding Petitioner/Appellant 
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Robert Lee Jones from any inheritance from the Estate of his 
father, Herbert Lee Jones, deceased. 
B. Disposition of the Case Below. 
On July 19, 1985, Petitioner/Respondent Linda M. 
Cameron filed a Petitioner for Formal Probate of Will and 
Appointment of Personal Representative, alleging that her 
father, Herbert Lee Jones, had died on July 5, 1985. 
Accompanying the Petition for Formal Probate of Will and 
Appointment of Personal Representative was a document dated May 
1, 1985, which was alleged to be the decedent's will and which 
Linda Cameron sought to have probated. (R. 5-7.). On August 
6, 1985, Petitioner/Appellant Robert Lee Jones filed an 
Objection to Petition for Formal Probate and Formal Appointment 
of Personal Representative; and Counter Petition for Formal 
Appointment of Special Administrator, (R. 9-14.), which he 
amended on February 3, 1986. (R. 40-45.) The matter was 
referred to the trial division of the district court from the 
probate division and a trial to the court was held on February 
10, 1986, the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson presiding. 
Following the trial, the court issued a minute entry dated 
February 19, 1986. (R. 93-94). The court subsequently entered 
Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law finding the 
issues in favor of Linda Cameron. (R. 110-113.) On April 15, 
1986, the court entered the Formal Probate of Will and 
Appointment of Personal Representative from which Robert Lee 
Jones has appealed. (R. 114-15.) 
C. Statement of Facts, 
This is a will contest between the two surviving heirs 
of Herbert Lee Jones who died on July 5, 1985, at the age of 71 
years, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. For approximately 
two months prior to his death, he had resided in Salt Lake 
- County with his daughter, Respondent Linda M. Cameron. Prior 
to moving to Utah in May, 1985, he had resided during his 
entire life in the State of California. He was divorced and 
the father of two children, Appellant Robert Lee Jones and 
Respondent Linda M. Cameron. 
The present case focuses on a document signed by 
Herbert Jones on May 1, 1985, in La Puente Valley Hospital, 
West Covina, California. Herbert Jones had been admitted to 
the hospital for surgery. He had been diagnosed as having 
cancer of the colon and was scheduled for a peritoneal 
resection and a colostomy. (Tr. 34.) After learning that her 
father was in the hospital, Mrs. Cameron travelled from Utah to 
California, arriving on April 30, 1985. Herbert Jones was 
greatly relieved to see his daughter and requested that she 
take care of all of his affairs, including his salvage grease 
business. She spent the night going through his papers and 
books, sorting out his bills and papers. The next day, May 1, 
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1985, she visited him again in the hospital and informed him 
that she wanted him to sign a document giving her a power of 
attorney so that she could put her name on his checking 
account, pay his bills, and take care of his business and other 
affairs. He assented, and she prepared a document, in her own 
handwriting, which stated: 
I, HERBERT LEE JONES, grant power of ATTORNEY to 
my daughter; LINDA M. CAMERON. 
(Tr. 10-13.) The document was admitted as Exhibit 1. 
At the trial, Mrs. Cameron testified also that she 
told her father that he needed a will, to which he also 
agreed. She testified that, thereupon, she changed the period 
at the end of the sentence quoted above to a comma and added 
the following language: "AND TO BE EXECUTER [sic] AND SOLE 
BENEFICIARY TO MY ESTATE." (Tr. 20.) Mrs. Cameron claims that 
her father signed the document in its completed form on May 1, 
1985. The document was filed with the court to be probated as 
Herbert Jones' will. (R. 6.) 
During his discussion with Linda Cameron on May 1, 
1985, in the hospital, Herbert Jones gave her directions for 
the handling of his personal and business affairs. (Tr. 9-11, 
13, 37-39.) He also gave her directions regarding the 
distribution of items of personal property which he wanted 
others to have. (Tr. 49-51.) At the trial, Linda Cameron 
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testified that she distributed those items according to her 
father's request, including a guitar, which was given to Volita 
Jones. (Tr. 50-51.) 
After receiving the signed power of attorney, Linda 
Cameron undertook to manage and control all of her father's 
affairs. She put her name on his checking accounty, signed 
checks (writing her own name), paid his bills, and had his 
mailing address changed to her own address so that she would 
receive all of his mail. (Tr. 11, 13, 37-46.) She organized 
all of his papers and documents and made arrangements for his 
business to be taken care of. (Tr. 11, 44.) Mrs. Cameron 
reviewed all of the medical forms that he was required to sign 
in connection with the surgery, including one that was 
approximately one-quarter of an inch thick. She did so, as she 
testified, because she did not want to make a mistake. (Tr. 
58.) 
Linda Cameron subsequently engaged a real estate agent 
and listed her father's home in California for sale. She 
reviewed all of the necessary forms and showed her father where 
to sign, which he did. (Tr. 64, 66-67.) He trusted her 
judgment in the matter. She testified that he signed whatever 
she put in front of him. (Tr. 59.) 
Mrs. Cameron testified that her father reposed great 
trust and confidence in her. She had graduated from high 
school, and had attended several colleges. She was also an 
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instructor at the University of Utah. (Tr. 39-40.) Her 
father, on the other hand, had only received one and one-half 
years of formal education. (Tr. 39.) He had been employed 
throughout his adult life as a salvage grease buyer. It was 
his job to pick up used grease from restaurants and to 
transport it to a factory to be used in making soap. (Tr. 
10-11.) Mrs. Cameron testified that "he always trusted me with 
- everything." (Tr. 59.) fHe counted on me because I am 
educated. And he looked up to me for what I do. He trusted me 
with his whole life basically." (Tr. 60.) According to 
Herbert's brother, Spencer Jones, Herbert "depended on her for 
lots of things," "and was proud of her accomplishments." She 
"seemed to be the only one he did trust." (Tr. 111.) 
On May 2, 1985, Linda Cameron met her brother Robert 
Jones at their father's home in California. Both testified at 
the trial that, during the course of the conversation, Linda 
Cameron told Robert Jones that their father, Herbert Jones, did 
not have a Will. (Tr. 69-70, 178-79.) Mrs. Cameron claimed at 
the trial that she lied to her brother when she made the 
statement. (Tr. 70.) 
There was substantial evidence adduced at the trial 
that Herbert Lee Jones was extremely anxious and apprehensive 
about being in the hospital and having an operation. According 
to Linda Cameron, he was "really scared about having an 
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operation." (Tr. 25, 56, 60.) Other witnesses similarly 
testified. (Tr. 112, 166-67, 173.) According to Mrs. Cameron, 
on May 1, 1985, when he signed the document in question, nobody 
knew how the operation would turn out, (Tr. 60-61), and he 
appeared obviously apprehensive to all who visited him in the 
hospital. Robert Jones testified that, based on his experience 
with his father, he belived his father had always had "a lot of 
mental problems," "a lot of anxiety, and a lot of paranoia." 
(Tr. 184.) In addition to having cancer, Herbert Jones was 
also blind in one eye and had either glaucoma or a cataract in 
the other and had trouble with his vision. (Tr. 59-172.) 
There was a conflict in the testimony about whether 
the second part of the purported will (Exhibit 1), which made 
Linda Cameron the executor and sole beneficiary of her father's 
estate, was added to the document before it was signed by 
Herbert: Jones. Mrs. Cameron testified that when she wrote the 
first part of the document, giving her the power of attorney, 
the pen skipped and that she used a different black pen to 
write the second part. (Tr. 21, 47.) Two witnesses at the 
trial testified, however, that the second part of the document 
had originally been written in blue or blue/black ink. George 
Throckmorton, a forensic document examiner, testified as an 
expert witness that he had examined the document under infrared 
light using a microscope and that it was his opinion that the 
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second part of the document had been originally written in 
blue/black ink and then subsequently written over in black 
ink. (Tr. 146-48.) Similarly, Christopher Andrew testified 
that he had examined the purported will on two occasions after 
it had been filed for probate with the court, once in the fall 
of 1985, and the second time the week before the trial. He 
testified that the first time he saw the document he observed 
that the second part was written in blue/black ink. When he 
examined the document the week before the trial, however, he 
noticed that it had been overwritten in black ink, with the 
exception of the comma which was still in blue ink. (Tr. 
129-30.) 
Mr. Throckmorton testified also that, based upon his 
comparison of the hand writing on the first part of the 
document with the hand writing on the second part, it was his 
opinion that the two parts were written by different people and 
that there was so much the dissimilarity between the two hand 
writing styles that the same person could not have written both 
parts within the space of an hour, as claimed by Linda 
Cameron. (Tr. 138-46.) 
Following the trial to the court, the court generally 
found the issues in favor of Linda Cameron and entered Amended 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. (R. 110-12.) The 
court found that there was no confidential relationship between 
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Linda Cameron and her father and that the purported will 
(Exhibit 1) had been completed in its entirety before it was 
signed by her father and the witnesses. The trial court also 
found that the will was not procured by the undue influence of 
any person. The Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law were entered over the objections of Robert Jones. (R. 
97-101.) Following the entry of this order, Robert Jones filed 
-his Notice of Appeal on April 28, 1986. (R. 119.) The court 
entered the Formal Probate of Will and Appointment of Personal 
Representative on April 15, 1986. (R. 114-15.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. A confidential relationship existed between Linda 
Cameron and her father, Herbert Lee Jones. The existence of a 
confidential relationship should be presumed because she was 
the daughter of the decedent. Moreover, the facts demonstrated 
a close relationship of trust and confidence between Mrs. 
Cameron and her father. On May 1, 1985, the day on which the 
document in question was signed, he had placed into her hands 
all of his personal and business affairs. He trusted her in 
everything, according to her testimony. She reviewed all 
documents before he signed them and he signed whatever she put 
in front of him. Because of the existence of a confidential 
relationship, the lower court committed error in not presuming 
that the purported will was procured through her undue 
influence. 
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2. The lower court also committed error in not 
presuming that Linda Cameron procured the purported will 
through undue influence on the grounds that she prepared the 
document. She not only prepared the document, but according to 
her testimony, she suggested to her father that he needed a 
will. She wrote it using her own language knowing that her 
father did not understand what she was doing but would sign 
whatever she put in front of him. 
3. Utah Code Ann. § 75-1-308 provides that appeals 
in cases such as this are to be considered as cases in equity. 
This court has a duty to weigh facts, to determine whether the 
evidence preponderated against the findings of the lower 
court. In this case, the evidence did preponderate against th< 
findings of the lower court that there was no confidential 
relationship, that there was no undue influence, and that the 
purported will was not altered after it was signed by Herbert 
Lee Jones. 
4. The evidence at the lower court was not 
sufficient to rebutt the presumption of undue influence. The 
evidence demonstrated overwhelmingly, according to the 
testimony of Linda Cameron and other witnesses, that Herbert 
Jones placed all of his trust and confidence in her. He 
allowed her to take control of all of his personal and business 
affairs. She obtained his power of attorney, put her name on 
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his banking account, wrote checks from the account, changed his 
mailing address to her own address so that she would receive 
his mail, and made arrangements for his business to be taken 
care of while he was in the hospital. She arranged for his 
house to be listed and sold and had him sign a real estate 
listing; agreement. She also reviewed medical forms and showed 
him where to sign. Herbert Jones was in the hospital to have 
an operation for cancer and was very worried and anxious about 
hte procedure. The testimony was uncontroverted that he had a 
great fear of hospitals and doctors. There was additional 
evidence that he had mental problems and suffered from paranoia 
which caused him to rely completely on his children in such 
times. Linda Cameron took advantage of him at a time when he 
was most susceptible to her influence. 
5. Even if this court affirms the finding that the 
document dated May 1, 1985, was the last will of Herbert Jones, 
Robert Jones is entitled to inherit his intestate share of the 
Estate as a pretermitted heir under Utah Code Ann. 75-2-302. 
That statute requires a presumption that an heir was 
unintentionally omitted unless it appears from the will that 
the omission was intentional. The document in question 
contains no such language on its face. The lower court 
committed error in considering extrinsic evidence regarding the 
intent of Herbert Lee Jones. 
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6. The lower court also committed error in finding 
that the purported will was not altered after it was signed by 
Herbert Lee Jones. The evidence adduced below preponderates 
against this finding• The evidence demonstrated that the 
second part of the document was originally written in 
blue/black ink by a different person than the person who wrote 
the first part. At a time Herbert Lee Jones signed the 
document, it contained nothing more than a provision giving 
Linda Cameron his power of attorney. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN REFUSING 
TO HOLD THAT THERE WAS A CONFIDENTIAL RELATIONSHIP 
BETWEEN LINDA CAMERON AND HER FATHER, HERBERT LEE 
JONES, GIVING RISE TO A PRESUMPTION THAT THE PURPORTED 
WILL WAS PROCURRED THROUGH HER UNDUE INFLUENCE. 
Robert Jones objected to the probate of the 1 May 1985 
document on the grounds that it was procured by the undue 
influence of Linda Cameron. (R. 41.) This Court described the 
elements of undue influence in the case of In re BryanTs 
Estate, 82 Utah 390, 25 P.2d 602 (1933): 
Undue influence may be established without 
showing any physical coercion or constraint. The 
influence that vitiates may be subtle and be 
entirely without outward demonstration, but in 
whatever form it may appear it must, 
nevertheless, be made to appear from competent 
evidence that the will of the one accused of 
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practicing undue influence dominated the will of 
the testator--that the testament is in fact and 
effect the will of the accused and not that of 
the testator. 
Id. at 620. See In re Lavelle's Estate, 122 Utah 253, 248 
P.2d 372, 378 (1952) ("undue influence is seldom subject to 
direct proof, but, as a general rule, must be established by 
inferences and circumstances"). 
As shown below, this Court has uniformly held that the 
existence of a confidential relationship between the 
beneficiary of a will and the testator will give rise to a 
presumption of undue influence. The evidence presented at 
trial clearly demonstrated the existence of a confidential 
relationship between Linda Cameron and her father. The trial 
court committed error as a matter of law in finding that there 
was no confidential relationship. 
In the case of Robertson v. Campbell, 674 P.2d 1226 
(Utah 1983), the Court held that a trust instrument executed 
simultaneously with a will, which had been previously declared 
invalid by reason of undue influence, was also invalid on the 
same grounds. Regarding the existence of a confidential 
relationship between the beneficiary and the trustor, the court 
stated: 
The doctrine of confidential relations requires 
that if a confidential relationship is found to 
exist between two parties in a transaction, and 
if the superior party (in whom trust has been 
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reposed) benefits from the transaction, then 
"equity raises a presumption of undue influence 
and casts upon that party the burden to show 
affirmatively entire fairness on his part and 
freedom of the other from undue influence." 
Id. at 1233 n.5. See In re Estate of Swan, 4 Utah 2d 277, 
293 P.2d 682, 686, 689, 691-93 (1956) (preparation by attorney 
of will under which he was a beneficiary gave rise to 
presumption that the will was procured by undue influence by 
the attorney, which shifted the burden of proof onto the 
confidential advisor to persuade the fact finder by a 
preponderance of the evidence that no fraud or undue influence 
was exerted and that his actions were fair and took no unfair 
advantage of his superior position, which was presumed); In re 
Bryan's Estate, 82 Utah 390, 25 P.2d at 609-10 (evidence that 
the beneficiary of a will was in a confidential relationship 
with the testator and was active in the preparation of the will 
gives rise to a presumption of undue influence). 
Although the existence of a confidential relationship 
between two persons is generally a question of fact, the law 
presumes a parent-child relationship to be confidential. 
Blodgett v. Martsch, 590 P.2d 298, 302 (Utah 1978). In 
Blodgett, the Court stated that "[t]here are a few 
relationships (such as parent-child, attorney-client, and 
trustee-cestui) which the law presumes to be confidential." 
Id. at 302. According to the Court, a confidential 
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relationship, where not presumed, will otherwise arise ,f[i]f 
the circumstances are such that the defendant could exercise 
extraordinary influence over the plaintiff and the defendant 
was or should have been aware that plaintiff reposed trust and 
confidence in the defendant and reasonably relied on 
defendant's guidance.ff Id. at 302. A course of dealing 
between persons in a confidential relationship, held the Court, 
"is watched with extreme jealousy and solicitude, and if there 
is found the slightest trace of undue influence or unfair 
advantage, redress will be given to the injured party." Id. 
This principle was followed by the Court, in Johnson 
v. Johnson, 9 Utah 2d 40, 337 P.2d 420 (1959). There, the 
Court rescinded certain deeds given by a father to his son. 
The Court held that a confidential relation existed between the 
father and the son which gave rise to a presumption that the 
transaction was unfair. Id. at 422. The court stated: 
There can be no doubt about the existence of a 
confidential relationship here of the very kind 
for which the above rule was fashioned. The 
evidence shows that his father reposed great 
confidence in Calvin [the son]. This is 
epitomized by his cooperating with him in making 
final arrangements about his property for the 
eventuality of death. 
Id. at 422. 
The evidence in the present case left no doubt about 
the existence of a confidential relationship between Linda 
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Cameron and her father, Herbert Lee Jones. The existence of 
the confidential relationship between them justified a 
presumption of undue influence. The trial court committed 
error in not finding the existence of a confidential 
relationship and holding that a presumption of undue influence 
had arisen which Linda Cameron had the burden of overcoming. 
The court's finding that there was no confidential 
relationship and that there was no presumption of undue 
influence, entered over the objections of Robert Jones (R. 
97-100), was contrary to the evidence of the close relationship 
of trust and confidence that existed between Herbert Jones and 
his daughter. Through their numerous communications over the 
years, a relationship of trust developed which led Herbert 
Jones to give all of his affairs into her hands on May 1, 1985, 
as he lay in the hospital preparing for an operation for cancer 
of the colon. Linda Cameron testified that her father "always 
trusted me with everything." "He counted on me because I am 
educated. And he looked up to me for what I do. He trusted me 
with his whole life basically." (Tr. 59-60.) Herbert Jones, 
who had only one and a half years of education, was aware of 
his daughter's education, who had attended several colleges and 
was an instructor at the University of Utah. (Tr. 39-40, 60.) 
According to the decedent's brother, Spencer Jones, the 
decedent "depended on her for lots of things," and was proud of 
_1 -7_ 
her accomplishments. She "seemed to be the only one he did 
trust/' (Tr. 111.) 
It was clear from his conduct that Herbert Jones 
trusted his daughter on everything and did whatever she 
suggested. He agreed, on her request, to sign a power of 
attorney authorizing her to put her name on his checking 
account, to pay his bills, to take care of his business. 
According to her testimony he also agreed with her statement to 
him that he needed a will, which she wrote and had him sign. 
He signed whatever she put in front of him, including the power 
of attorney, and medical and real estate forms. (Tr. 58, 59, 
66-67). After arriving in California on April 30, 1985, Linda 
Cameron took control of his affairs. She put her name on his 
bank accounty and changed his address to her own so that she 
would receive his mail at her home. She paid his bills and 
made arrangements for his business to be taken care of. She 
acted as his agent and advisor. He did and signed whatever she 
told him to do. 
Not only was Linda Cameron the daughter of Herbert 
Jones, which is sufficient by itself to presume a confidential 
relationship, but she was his attorney in fact as well, having 
been given his power of attorney. As the court stated in 
Byars v. Stone, 186 Va. 518, 42 S.E.2d 847 (1947): 
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An attorney occupies toward his client a high 
position of trust and confidence, and in his 
relations with his client it is his duty to 
exercise and maintain the utmost good faith, 
integrity, fairness and fidelity. 
• • • • 
Similar principles apply to the agency 
relationship . . . . 
Id. 42 S.E.2d at 852. See Tatsuno v. Kasai, 70 Utah 203, 
259 P. 318, 322 (1927) (Court held that an agent, as a 
counselor and advisor, was not entitled to take advantage of 
the superior position in which the agency relationship placed 
him); 3 Am. Jur. 2d, Agency § 210, at 713 (1986) ("An agent is 
a fiduciary with respect to the matters within the scope of his 
agency. The very relationship implies that the principal has 
reposed some trust or confidence in the agent, and the agent or 
employee is bound to the exercise of the utmost in good faith, 
loyalty, and honesty toward his principal or employer"). 
Appellant Robert Jones urges this court to reverse the 
order of the trial court and to remand it with directions that 
it find that a confidential relationship existed, thus giving 
rise to a presumption of undue influence, the burden of 
overcoming which fell upon Linda Cameron. 
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II. 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT 
THE PURPORTED WILL WAS PRESUMED TO HAVE BEEN 
PROCURED THROUGH THE UNDUE INFLUENCE OF 
LINDA CAMERON ON THE GROUNDS THAT SHE DRAFTED THE 
DOCUMENT AND WAS THE SOLE BENEFICIARY THEREUNDER. 
In Finding of Fact No. 4, the trial court found that 
the will was drafted by decedent's daughter, Linda Cameron. 
(R. 111.) This by itself was sufficient to give rise to a 
presumption of undue influence. A presumption of undue 
influence arises if the one who drafted a will, or was 
otherwise active in preparing it or having it executed, also 
receives a substantial benefit thereunder. The general rule is 
set forth as follows: 
Most of the authorities support the view that a 
presumption of undue influence arises upon a 
showing that one who drew the will, or was 
otherwise active directly in preparing it or 
procuring its execution, obtains under the will a 
substantial benefit, to which he has a natural 
claim, or a benefit which, in amount, is out of 
proportion to the amounts received by other 
persons having an equal claim to participate in 
the bounty of the testator. At least, the 
presumption of undue influence is raised where 
such circumstances are combined with the 
existence of a confidential relation between the 
testator and the beneficiary who was thus active 
in drawing the will . . . . Some cases appear to 
hold that undue influence is presumed from the 
facts that the will was drafted by a beneficiary 
favored thereunder and executed by the testator 
without obtaining independent legal advice. 
79 Am. Jur. 2d Wills § 429 (1975). See Annot. "Presumption 
or Inference of Undue Influence from Testamentary Gift to 
Relative, Friend, or Associate of Person Preparing Will or 
Procurring Its Execution," 13 A.L.R.3d 385. 
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Because of this presumption of undue influence which 
arises from the presence of a beneficiary or her participation 
in the execution of the will, the courts in sustaining a will, 
sometimes refer to the fact that none of the beneficiaries 
participated in the preparation or execution of the will. 
See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sevier, 165 Ky. 158, 176 S.W. 961, 
963 (1915); In re Millerfs Estate, 175 Pa. 645, 36 A. 138, 142 
(1897). 
The fact that Linda Cameron wrote the document which 
she claims constituted her father's will is one more reason the 
lower court should have presumed that it was procured by undue 
influence. Not only did Linda Cameron write the document, she 
wrote it using language that decedent would not understand and 
took no effort to explain it to him. She testified that he had 
not used the terms "sole beneficiary" and "estate" in his 
discussion with her in his hospital room and she did not 
explain the terms to him. (Tr. 49). She drafted the document 
the way she did, as she testified, because it was her 
impression that her father was putting the distribution of 
everything he owned into her hands. (Tr. 49-50.) This is a 
case where the purported will was not only drafted by the 
decedent's daughter and sole beneficiary, but where she 
suggested that he needed a will (Tr. 47) and drafted a document 
using language that he did not understand and knowing full well 
that he would sign it because of his complete trust in her. As 
she testified, he signed whatever she placed in front of him 
(Tr. 59) and trusted her "with everything" (Tr. 59), even with 
"his whole life." (Tr. 60.) 
Accordingly, this Court should reverse the lower court 
for its refusal to hold that the document was presumed to have 
been procured through the undue influence of Linda Cameron on 
- the grounds that she drafted the document and was the sole 
beneficiary thereunder. 
III. 
THIS COURT SHOULD REVIEW THE FINDINGS OF 
THE TRIAL COURT AS A CASE IN EQUITY 
The Utah Uniform Probate Code, Utah Code Ann. § 
75-1-308 (Repl. Vol. 1978), specifies the scope of appellate 
review in this case: 
Appellate review, including the right to 
appellate review, interlocutory appeal, 
provisions as to time, manner, notice, appeal 
bond, stays, scope of review, record on appeal, 
briefs, arguments and power of the appellate 
court, is governed by the rules applicable to 
the appeals to the Supreme Court in equity cases 
from the court of general jusisdiction, except 
that in proceedings where jury trial has been had 
as a matter of right, the rules applicable to the 
scope of review in jury cases apply. 
(Emphasis added.) 
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This case must accordingly be treated as a case in 
equity, under which standard this Court "has a duty, when 
called upon, to weigh the facts as well as to review the law." 
Jensen v. Brown, 639 P.2d 150, 151 (Utah 1981). According to 
In the Matter of the Estate of Hock, 655 P.2d 1111 (Utah 
1982), the Supreme Court in an appeal in an equity proceeding, 
will "assess the quality and quantity of the evidence to 
determine whether it fclearly preponderates against1 the trial 
court's finding that the appropriate standard of proof has been 
satisfied." Id. at 1114 n.l. See Prowitt v. Lunt, 103 Utah 
574, 137 P.2d 361 (1943) ("As this is a suit in equity for the 
rescission of a contract, it is our duty to make an independent 
examination of the record and to review and weigh the evidence 
presented by the record.") 
Accordingly, Appellant Robert Jones urges this Court 
to review certain of the Findings of Fact against which the 
evidence clearly preponderated. Specifically, this Court 
should review the following Findings of Fact (R. Ill): 
1. The rule that the Supreme Court should review 
factual issues in equity cases appears to have had its genesis 
in Utah Constitution Art. VIII § 9 (Repealed 1984), which 
provided that "[i]n equity cases the appeal may be on questions 
of both law and fact." Although that provision was repealed 
and replaced by the new Article VIII, which became effective 
July 1, 1985, the rule continues to have viability as indicated 
by Dugan v. Jones, 39 Utah Adv. Rep. 37 (Utah 1986) ("In this 
proceeding in equity, this Court is free to review both the 
facts and the law as found and applied by the trial Court, but 
will not disturb the trial Court's findings of facts unless the 
evidence clearly preponderates against them.") 
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5. At the time of the drafting of the Will, 
there was no confidential relationship 
between the decedent and his daughter Linda 
Cameron. 
6. The phrase "and to be executer [sic] and 
sole beneficiary to my estate" was added to 
an unsigned document on May 1, 1985, by the 
petitioner Linda Cameron. The phrase was 
added to the unsigned document in the 
presence of the deceased and executed the 
document including the added phrase as his 
Will in the presence of the witnesses, and 
he and the witnesses executed it in the 
presence of each other. 
7. The making of the Will was not procurred by 
the undue influence of any person. 
8. The language of the Will without the aid of 
extrinsic evidence showed the intent of the 
decedent to intentionally omit his son, 
2 
petitioner Robert Lee Jones from the Will. 
As discussed below, the Court's findings are in error 
and should be reversed. 
IV. 
THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED AT TRIAL WAS NOT SUFFICIENT TO 
OVERCOME A PRESUMPTION THAT THE PURPORTED WILL WAS 
PROCURED BY THE UNDUE INFLUENCE OF LINDA CAMERON. 
As argued above, the evidence presented at trial 
clearly demonstrated the existence of a confidential 
2. This finding involves a question of law and not 
of fact. Whether "[i]t appears from the Will that the omission 
[of Robert Jones] was intentional" within the meaning of Utah 
Code Ann. § 75-2-302(a) is a question for the Court to decide. 
On appeal, this Court should review the lower Court's finding 
as it would any conclusion of law. 
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relationship between Herbert Jones and his daughter, Linda, 
which created a presumption that she acted with undue 
influence. The evidence was also clear that she in fact acted 
with undue influence in urging her father to sign the document 
that she prepared giving her his power of attorney and making 
her the sole beneficiary of his estate. She took advantage of 
his trust and confidence in a situation in which he was 
- particularly susceptible to her influence, two days before his 
operation for cancer. As noted above, Herbert Jones trusted 
his daughter with everything, even with "his whole life." (Tr. 
60.) According to Herbert's brother, Spencer Jones, Mrs. 
Cameron "seemed to be the only one he did trust." (Tr. 111.) 
All of the witnesses who knew Herbert Jones were 
unanimous in their opinion that he was very nervous and 
apprehensive about being in the hospital and having an 
operation. He had been diagnosed as having cancer and was to 
undergo a peritoneal resection and a colostomy. (Tr. 34.) 
According to Linda Cameron he was "really scared about having 
an operation." (Tr. 25.) See Tr. 56, 60, 112, 166-67, 173. 
According to Mrs. Cameron, on May 1, 1985, when he signed the 
document in question, nobody knew how the operation would turn 
out, (Tr. 60-61), and he appeared obviously apprehensive to all 
who visited him in the hospital. 
Robert Jones testified that, based on his life-long 
experience with his father, he believed his father had always 
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had "a lot of mental problems," "a lot of anxiety, and a lot of 
paranoia." (Tr. 184.) Robert Jones had lived with his father 
until he went into the Navy at age 18. He lived with his 
father for a year after returning from the service and then for 
nearly two years in 1979 and 1980. He testified that he saw 
his father an average of twice a month when not living with 
him, for a period of approximately twenty years. (Tr. 
159-60.) During all of the experience that Robert Jones had 
with his father, he observed peculiarities in his behavior. 
Robert testified that his father "couldn't stand being around 
other people. He couldn't stand to be in elevators. He 
couldn't stand to be in crowded rooms." (Tr. 167.) Herbert 
refused to go the doctor for eye treatment that could have 
restored his vision in one eye. (Tr. 172-73.) Robert never 
saw his father attend a wedding, funeral, or social function. 
(Tr. 167.) Herbert Jones did not attend the funeral of his son 
Everett (Tr. 167), and refused to visit Robert when, as a seven 
year old boy, he spent nine months in the hospital with polio. 
(Tr. 162.) Robert testified that there were periods of time 
when his father would become particularly despondent and would 
sit in a darkened room for long periods of time. (Tr. 163, 
165.) It was one such incident in 1979 when Herbert informed 
Robert that he believed he was going to die that caused Robert 
to move in with his father for approximately two years. (Tr. 
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165.) During that period of time, Herbert Jones relied totally 
on his son, Robert, who took him to five different doctors, 
including a psychiatrist, in an effort to help him recover. 
Robert ran his grease route with him and took care of him for 
that period of time. (Tr. 173.) Herbert relied totally on his 
son. (Tr. 185.) 
That propensity to rely on his children in times of 
depression and fear was manifested in Herbert's dealings with 
Linda Cameron when he was in the hospital on May 1, 1985, two 
days before his cancer operation. He wanted her to take care 
of all of his affairs. He was so relieved to see her when she 
arrived from Utah, that he "[k]ind of wilted when [she] walked 
into the room and [they] sat down next to each other and 
cried." (Tr. 9.) He told her where he kept his papers, which 
she spent the night going through. (Tr. 10.) From that point 
on, everything that Herbert Jones did was at his daughter's 
direction. He placed himself entirely in her hands. She 
testified that he trusted her "with everything," "with his 
whole life." (Tr. 59, 60.) She described the preparation of 
the power of attorney, Exhibit 1, as follows: 
Q. Okay. Now would you please describe the 
events of May 1? When you saw your father, 
then what happened? 
A. I sacked up a bunch of his papers, his check 
book and drove his grease truck down to the 
hospital. Walked in and visited with him 
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for a while, and I told him all the things 
that I had felt I needed to do that day. I 
needed to get to the bank and the post 
office and generally get his business in 
order. 
And I said, "I have to go to the bank. In 
order to write your checks I need my name on 
your checking account." And I wanted him to 
sign a Power of Attorney. There was a form 
that I had. I wrote it. 
(Tr. 11.) The document giving her power of attorney was 
- introduced as Exhibit 1. 
After having her father sign the power of attorney 
document, she had her name put on his bank account and wrote 
checks in the account. (Tr. 43, 45.) She made arrangements 
for his grease route to be taken care of. (Tr. 44, 45.) She 
changed his mailing address with the Post Office so that all of 
his mail would go to her home. (Tr. 46.) Mrs. Cameron 
testified that she read all of the forms that he needed to sign 
in the hospital and had him sign them. (Tr. 57-58.) She 
testified that he signed whatever she put in front of her 
father for him to sign, (Tr. 59.) In addition to the medical 
forms that he signed in the hospital, she had him sign a real 
estate listing agreement in California listing his home for 
sale. He signed it, as she testified, because he trusted her 
judgment regarding the transaction. (Tr. 67.) 
At the trial, Mrs. Cameron testified that her father 
had said something in the hospital to the effect that he did 
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not want his son Robert to "have anything." There was no 
testimony about what Herbert Jones meant by this statement or 
that he was talking about how he wanted his estate to go when 
he died. Linda Cameron testified that there was absolutely no 
discussion in the hospital on May 1, 1985, about the 
possibility of his dying or that his cancer would be terminal. 
(Tr. 71.) Even so, Mrs. Cameron claims that when Herbert Jones 
stated he did not want his son to have anything, she told him 
that he needed a will, to which he agreed. (Tr. 19-20, 47.) 
She testified further that she added the second part of Exhibit 
1, which read "AND TO BE EXECUTER [sic] AND SOLE BENEFICIARY TO 
MY ESTATE." (Tr. 20.) She claims she read it to her father 
and that all he said was "good." (Tr. 20.) The language of 
the document was created entirely by Linda Cameron. He did not 
dictate it to her or tell her what to write. She made no 
effort to explain the document to her father. He did not tell 
her that he wanted her to be "sole beneficiary" or the 
"executor" of his estate, neither of which terms he used in his 
discussion with Linda Cameron in the hospital. She admitted 
that she made no effort to explain the terms to him. (Tr. 
48-49.) 
There was evidence at the trial that Herbert Jones did 
not intend Linda Cameron to be his sole beneficiary. She 
testified as follows: 
And was it your impression then based on 
what your father said to you that he was 
putting the distribution of everything that 
he owned into your hands? 
Yes. He understood that. 
He wanted you to take care? 
More importantly, it wasn't that I would 
have everything. It was so that Bobby 
wouldn't get nothing. 
Did he want you to take some of his 
possessions and give them to other people? 
Yeah. 
Why do you say that? 
Because he told me. 
What did he say? 
That, well, he talked, one thing that I 
recall right now is that Volita said she 
wanted to have the guitar at one time. And 
then I was, you know, to remember about it. 
And he was, you know, going to go through 
and get one for her eventually. 
And your father knew that you knew what he 
wanted to gift [sic] to other people, the 
guitars for example? 
The things that were important to him he 
knew. 
So essentially he was leaving up to you the 
decision about what to give to other people 
and what not to give to them? 
Yeah. There wasn't a lot that he had in 
mind, but a few things that came into mind. 
Okay. But he didn't put that in this Will, 
did he? 
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A. That is not in the Will. No. 
Q. The Will just leaves everything to you, 
isn't that correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Is that your opinion of it? 
A. To do with as he wanted it done. 
Q. And were you going to make sure that Volita 
got the guitar or the banjo, whatever it was? 
A. Absolutely. 
Q. Have you done that? 
A. Uh-hum. It wasn't so much as an inheritance 
as something he always tried to remember he 
was going to do it. She got the guitar 
before we ever left. 
Q. You gave it to her even before you left 
California? 
A. Uh-hum. I loaded every musical instrument 
my father had in the house in the motorhome 
because he wanted them with him. In the 
process of going through them all I found 
the one, and he said, well--
(Tr. 49-51.) 
It is clear from this testimony that Herbert Jones did 
not intend the document to be his last will and that he did not 
understand what the words "sole beneficiary to my estate" 
meant. He simply left it to his daughter to prepare whatever 
document she thought he needed to sign, and he signed, not 
because he understood what he was doing, but because he was 
willing to do or sign whatever she wanted. The term "sole 
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beneficiary" was created by her and used entirely for her own 
convenience. He did not understand what it was he was signing, 
having had only one and a half years of formal education. The 
terms "sole beneficiary" and "estate" were her words, not his. 
He signed the document because he had placed himself entirely 
in her hands. Mrs. Cameron testified that he would sign 
whatever she put in front of him to sign. (Tr. 59.) As she 
said: "He counted on me because I am educated. And he looked 
up to me for what I do. He trusted me with his whole life, 
basically." (Tr. 60.) 
Mrs. Cameron's ability to exercise undue influence was 
made easier by her father's ill health and poor physical 
condition. A decedent's weakened physical condition at the 
time of the execution of will may be considered in determining 
whether he was unduly influenced. As the Court observed in In 
re Bryan's Estate, 82 Utah 390, 25 P.2d 602 (1933), "the 
amount of influence necessary to dominate a mind impaired by 
age, disease, or dissipation [is] obviously less than that 
required to control a strong mind." 25 P.2d 610. See In re 
George's Estate, 100 Utah 230, 112 P.2d 498, 501 (1941) (the 
weakened physical condition of a testator is a "fertile field 
for undue influence"); In re Hanson's Estate, 87 Utah 580, 52 
P.2d 1103 (1935); Johnson v. Johnson, 9 Utah 2d 40, 337 P.2d 
420 (1959), 
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The evidence was uncontroverted that Herbert Jones was 
in the hospital because he had cancer. (Tr. 60.) He was blind 
in one eye and had either a cataract or glaucoma in the other. 
(Tr. 59, 172.) He was frightened and anxious about the 
operation he was to undergo two days later. She was at his 
bedside in the hospital when he was most susceptible to her 
influence and took advantage of that opportunity. 
As argued above, the trial court committed error in 
not presuming that the May 1, 1985, document was procured as a 
result of Linda Cameron's undue influence. Even in the absence 
of such a presumption, the court erred in not holding that 
Linda Cameron had in fact exercised undue influence over her 
father when he was in the hospital. The evidence given by Mrs. 
Cameron herself demonstrated that her will dominated his and 
that he did whatever she suggested and signed whatever was put 
in front of him. 
V. 
IF THE DOCUMENT DATED 1 MAY 1985 IS THE VALID WILL 
OF THE DECEDENT, ROBERT JONES IS ENTITLED 
TO INHERIT AS A PRETERMITTED CHILD. 
If this Court upholds the finding of the lower court 
that the 1 May 1985 document is the valid will of Herbert 
Jones, Robert Jones is entitled to take his intestate share of 
the Estate as a pretermitted heir under Utah Code Ann. § 
75-2-302 (Repl. Vol. 1978), which provides: 
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Pretermitted Children. -- (1) If a testator 
fails to provide in his will for any of his 
children or issue of a deceased child, the 
omitted child or issue receives a share in the 
estate equal in value to that which he would have 
received if the testator had died intestate 
unless: 
(a) It appears from the will that the 
omission was intentional; 
(b) When the will was executed the testator 
had one or more children and devised 
substantially all his estate to or for the 
exclusive benefit of the other parent of the 
omitted child, or of the deceased child whose 
issue are omitted; or 
(c) The testator provided for the child or 
issue by transfer outside the will and the intent 
that the transfer be in lieu of a testamentary 
provision is shown by statements of the testator 
or from the amount of the transfer or other 
evidence. . . . 
(Emphasis added.) 
If none of the exceptions set forth in subparagraphs 
(a) through (c) of the statute are satisfied, the law presumes 
that the failure to mention the child in the will was 
unintentional. See In re Estate of Hilton, 98 N.M. 420, 649 
P.2d 448, 490-91 (1982) (case construing a pretermitted child 
statute similar to Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-302 (Repl. Vol. 1978)). 
A. The language contained in the 1 May 1985 
document drafted by Linda M. Cameron does 
not demonstrate the intent of the decedent 
to disinherit his son, Robert Jones. 
Section 75-2-302(1)(a) states that a child omitted 
from a will is entitled to inherit as a pretermitted child 
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unless ,f[i]t appears from the will that the omission was 
intentional/1 Id, The presumption created by Section 
75-2-302(1)(a) that Herbert Jones unintentionally omitted his 
son, can only be rebutted by language of the 1 May 1985 
document. In order to prove from the language of the 1 May 
1985 document that the omission of Robert Jones was 
intentional, the document must, at a minimum, either mention 
Robert Jones by name or fairly and clearly express an intention 
on the part of Herbert Jones to exclude his son as part of a 
group or a class. 
In Smith v. Crook, 160 Cal. App. 3d 245, 206 Cal. 
Rptr. 524 (1984), the court reversed the decision of the trial 
court and held that the statutory presumption against 
disinheritance stood unrebutted. The court stated: "In order 
for a testator to disinherit his lineal descendants, the intent 
to do so must be unmistakably expressed; it must appear on the 
face of the will that, at the time of its execution, the 
testator knowledgeably and intentionally omitted to provide for 
his descendants." Id. at 526. See In re Estate of Hilton, 
98 N.M. 420, 649 P.2d 488, 495 (1982) ("language of a will . . 
. must either mention the claimant by name or fairly and 
clearly express an intention on the part of the testator to 
exclude claimant as a group or class"); Crumpfs Estate v. 
Freeman, 614 P.2d 1096, 1099 (Okl. 1980) (in affirming the 
decision of the lower court that granddaughter was a 
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pretermitted heir because there was no mention of her by name 
or class the court held that [b]efore 'natural rights and 
expectation1 of one's issue to share in the ancestor's wealth 
may be legally extinguished, the intent to disinherit must 
appear upon the face of the will in strong and convincing 
language"); Estate of Hirschi, 113 Cal. App. 3d 681, 170 Cal. 
Rptr. 186, 188 (1980) (in affirming the decision of the lower 
court that petitioner was not a pretermitted heir of the 
deceased, the court stated that an heir may be disinherited if 
he belongs to a class of persons expressly excluded from the 
will of the testator); In re McClure's Estate, 214 Cal. App. 
2d 590, 29 Cal. Rptr. 569, 571 (1963) (affirming the lower 
court decision that the testamentary provision effectively 
expressed the intention of the testatrix to disinherit her 
granddaughter the court held that M[t]o establish an intent to 
disinherit a person claiming to be a pretermitted heir, it must 
appear on the face of the will that, at the time of its making, 
the testator had that person in mind and intentionally omitted 
\:o provide for him"). 
The 1 May 1985 document states in its entirety: 
I, HERBERT LEE JONES grant power of ATTORNEY to 
my daughter, LINDA M. CAMERON, AND TO BE EXECUTER 
[sic] AND SOLE BENEFICIARY TO MY ESTATE. 
The language of the document does not show that the omission of 
Robert Jones was intentional. No language mentions Robert 
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Jones by name or fairly and clearly expresses the intention of 
his father to exclude him as a part of a group or a class. It 
does not appear on the face of the 1 May 1985 document that at 
the time of its execution, Herbert Jones knowledgeably and 
intentionally omitted to provide for his son. No strong and 
convincing language manifesting an intent to disinherit appears 
upon the face of the 1 May 1985 document. There is no language 
in the 1 May 1985 document showing that Herbert Jones had his 
son, Robert Jones, in mind and intentionally omitted to provide 
for him. 
The term "sole beneficiary" used in the document, 
without mention of Robert Jones by name or as part of a 
disinherited group or class, is insufficient to prove that the 
omission was intentional. The testatorial disposition of an 
entire estate does not alone affirmatively evidence an intent 
to omit a child. See Crumpfs Estate v. Freeman, 614 P.2d 
1096, 1099 (Okl. 1980) (children of deceased were pretermitted 
even though the will of the decedent disposed of his entire 
estate). 
Accordingly, the presumption of section 75-2-302 is 
unrebutted and entitles Appellant Robert Jones as a 
pretermitted child to share in the estate of his father in 
accordance with the laws of intestate succession. 
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B
- Under Section 75-2-302(1)(a), extrinsic 
evidence is not admissible to overcome the 
presumption against disinheritance because 
the intention to disinherit must appear in 
the language of the will itself. 
In its Findings of Fact, the trial court stated ,f[t]he 
language of the will without the aid of extrinsic evidence 
showed the intent of the decedent to intentionally omit his 
son, petitioner Robert Lee Jones from the will." (R. 111.) In 
addition to the language of the will itself, the court also 
admitted and considered extrinsic evidence concerning Herbert 
Jones' intent. This evidence was admitted over the objections 
of Robert Jones. (Tr. 14-17, 82, 106-07). The court entered 
Finding of Fact No. 9, which states: "had the court considered 
the extrinsic evidence it heard, that consideration would have 
reinforced the showing of intent by the decedent to omit his 
son, petitioner Robert Lee Jones, from the will." (R. 112.) 
The trial court, although requested to do so, (R. 98), failed 
to specify what language of the will it was referring to that 
showed the intent of the decedent to intentionally omit his son. 
The language of Section 75-2-302(1)(a) is clear that 
an intent to disinherit must "appear from the will." See In 
re Estate of Hilton, 98 N.M. 420, 649 P.2d 488 (App. 1982). 
In Hilton, the court of Appeals of New Mexico interpreted the 
New Mexico pretermitted child statute. The New Mexico Statute 
is identical to the pretermitted child statute in Utah, 
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providing that an omitted child takes his intestate share 
unless "[i]t appears from the will that the omission was 
intentional." N.M. Stat. Ann. § 45-2-302 (1978). The New 
Mexico court held that, under the pretermitted child statute, 
extrinsic evidence is not admissible to overcome the 
presumption against disinheritance. The intent to disinherit, 
held the court, must appear in the language of the will 
itself. 649 P.2d at 491. See In re Estate of Crump, 614 
P.2d 1096, 1097 (Okl. 1980) (in affirming the decision of the 
lower court that the granddaughter of the testator was 
pretermitted, the court stated that an intentional omission 
3 
must appear from the four corners of the will). 
Because the 1 May 1985 document contains no language 
showing that Herbert Jones had his son in mind and 
intentionally omitted to provide for him, it is apparent that 
3. Linda Cameron may attempt, as she did in the lower 
court, to rely on the 1931 decision in In re Newell1s Estate, 
7 Utah 463, 5 P.2d 230 (1931), in which the Supreme Court of 
Utah held that extrinsic evidence was admissible to show an 
intent to disinherit. The statute construed in that case, 
however, was significantly different from Section 75-2-302 in 
that it allowed a pretermitted child to take his or her 
intestate share of the estate "unless it appears that such 
omission was intentional." Compiled Laws of Utah § 6341 
(1917). Thus, the statute in force at the time of the decision 
allowed the admission of extrinsic evidence. That statute has 
since been superseded by Section 75-2-302 which specifically 
states that it must "appear from the will that the omission was 
intentional." 
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the trial court relied on some type of extrinsic evidence in 
making its finding that the language of the document showed the 
intent of the decedent to intentionally omit his son. The 
consideration of the extrinsic evidence constituted reversible 
error. Because construction of the written document without 
consideration of extrinsic evidence is a question of law,, this 
Court should reverse the lower court ruling and should hold 
- that the will does not contain necessary language evidencing an 
intent to disinherit under Section 75-2-302(1)(a). 
C. The testator did not devise substantially 
all his estate to or for the exclusive 
benefit of the mother of the Petitioner 
Robert Jones and did not provide for his 
son by other transfer. 
The exceptions to the presumption against 
disinheritance contained in section 75-2-302(1)(b) and (l)(c) 
are not: applicable to the present case. There was no evidence 
that the decedent devised substantially all his estate to or 
for the exclusive benefit of the other parent of Robert Jones 
nor was there evidence that the decedent provided for his son 
outside the 1 May 1985 document. 
VI. 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT 
EXHIBIT 1 WAS SIGNED AS A WILL AND THAT 
IT WAS NOT ALTERED AFTER MAY 1, 1985. 
The lower Court found that the purported will was 
executed by Herbert Jones in its completed form on May 1, 
1985. (R. 111.) Linda Cameron testified that she added the 
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language, "AND TO BE EXECUTER [sic] AND SOLE BENEFICIARY TO MY 
ESTATE" after her father agreed with her direction that he 
needed a will. She stated that she wrote the first part of the 
document, giving her power of attorney, with a black Papermate 
pen, (Tr. 21), and the second part, making her executor and 
sole beneficiary, with a black Cross pen. (Tr. 47.) She could 
not recall which pen was used by the witnesses and Herbert 
Jones. (Tr. 47-48.) She made the change, she stated, because 
the first pen was having trouble writing. (Tr. 21.). 
Linda Cameron's testimony on this point was 
contradicted by significant evidence, including evidence 
apparent on the face of the document which shows clearly that 
the second part was originally written in blue/black ink and 
subsequently overwritten in black ink. At the trial, Robert 
Jones called Mr. George Throckmorton as an expert witness in 
the area of forensic document examination. He testified that 
he had examined the original May 1, 1986, document and that it 
was his opinion that the first part of the document was written 
by a different person than the one who wrote the second part 
which designated Linda Cameron as executor and sole 
beneficiary. (Tr. 138.) His opinion was based on the 
difference between the handwriting of the first part and second 
parts. The inconsistencies between the two parts "fell outside 
of the realm of natural variation," (Tr. 140.) and could not 
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have been written by the same person within the space of an 
hour. (Tr. 146.)* I n arriving at his opinions, Mr. 
Throckmorton testified that he compared certain letters in the 
first part with the same letter, in the second part, such as 
the letters "A," "N," "M," and "Y." (Tr. 140-46.) He 
testified, in addition, that there were nine other letters in 
which he noticed differences. (Tr. 155-56.) Moreover, the 
second part was written entirely in capital letters, in 
contrast to the first part. (Tr. 142.) 
Mr. Throckmorton testified that he had examined the 
document under a microscope and that the second part was 
originally written in blue/black ink which was overwritten or 
traced with a black ballpoint pen. (Tr. 139, 146-47.) The 
comma separating the two parts was originally written in black, 
but was thereafter made into a comma with blue ink, without any 
overwriting in black. (Tr. 147.) In Mr. Throckmorton's 
opinion it would have taken approximately two minutes for 
someone to have overwritten the second part in black ink. (Tr. 
149.) 
In addition to the testimony of Mr. Throckmorton 
regarding his examination of the document, Christopher Andrew 
testified that, as a courier employed by Robert Jones' legal 
counsel, he was requested on two separate occasions to travel 
to the clerk's office and to the document. The first time he 
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examined the document, in the fall of 1985, he noticed that 
"the second half of the document seemed to be written in a 
blue/black ink, whereas the first half of the document was just 
a plain black ink." (Tr. 129.) The second time he looked at 
the document in the clerk1s office was a week and a half before 
the trial, which occurred on February 10, 1986. On that 
occasion, he observed that "someone had written over the second 
- part with a black ink." (Tr. 129-30.) That overwriting had to 
have occurred after the document was filed for probate. 
Based upon the testimony of Mr. Throckmorton and Mr. 
Andrews, it is clear that the second part of the document, 
which purports to make Linda Cameron the executor and sole 
beneficiary of her father's estate, was not written with a 
black pen as she testified (Tr. 47.) but with a blue or 
blue/black pen. Moreover, the second part was not written by 
the same person who wrote the first part since, as Mr. 
Throckmorton testified, the natural variation in a person's 
handwriting would not allow for the inconsistencies and 
differences in handwriting between the first and the second 
parts of the document. The two parts could not have been 
written within the space of an hour by the same person. (Tr. 
146.) 
This evidence can only lead to the conclusion that the 
second part of the document was added later on, after it had 
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been signed by Herbert Lee Jones and the witnesses. After the 
document was filed for probate, someone checked it out of the 
clerk's office and wrote over the second part in black ink in 
an effort to make it look as if the entire document were 
written in black ink with the same pen. The document that 
Herbert Jones signed on May 1, 1985, was not a will, but was a 
power of attorney. Both Linda Cameron and Robert Jones 
testified that they had a conversation at their father's home 
on May 2, 1985, in which Mrs. Cameron told her brother Robert 
their father had no will. (Tr. 69-70, 178-79.) Although Mrs. 
Cameron now claims that she lied to her brother, her statement 
that there was no will fits with all the other evidence 
suggesting that the document was not signed as a will but that 
the second part was added later, presumably after Herbert's 
death. 
Because the evidence at trial clearly preponderated 
against the court's finding that the purported will was 
executed by Herbert Lee Jones as a will, this Court should 
exercise its equitable powers and reverse the trial court's 
decision. As argued above in Point III, because this is a case 
in equity the Court has the duty to review the facts of the 
case and to reverse when it appears that the evidence 
preponderated against the court's findings. 
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CONCLUSION 
The trial court committed error in not finding the 
existence of a confidential relationship between Linda Cameron 
and her father. Because of the great trust and confidence that 
existed between them as father and child, and because he placed 
all of his affairs in her hands, a confidential relationship 
should have been found. Moreover, she acted as his agent and 
attorney in fact, having been given his power of attorney. 
The court further committed error in refusing to 
presume that the purported will was procured by the undue 
influence of Linda Cameron. The lower court was required to 
hold that such a presumption existed not only because of the 
confidential relationship that existed between Linda Cameron 
and Herbert Jones but because she prepared the document and was 
the sole beneficiary thereunder. The evidence was insufficient 
to rebut the presumption against her that there was undue 
influence. Linda Cameron testified regarding the great trust 
and confidence her father had in her. She testified that he 
trusted her with everything, even his own life, and that he 
signed whatever she put in front of him to sign. 
The lower court also committed error in refusing to 
find that Robert Lee Jones was a pretermitted heir under the 
Utah pretermitted heir statute. The extrinsic evidence 
introduced at the trial should not have been admitted to show 
Herbert Lee Jones' intent to disinherit his son Robert. 
According to the statute, the court must look to the face of 
the will itself to determine an intent to disinherit. The 
document in question does not evidence any such intent on the 
part of Herbert Jones to disinherit his son Robert by 
identifying him or the class to which he belonged. 
Finally, the lower court erred in holding that the 
purported will was signed in its completed form by Herbert Lee 
Jones and that it was witnessed in that form and that it was 
not altered subsequently. The evidence adduced below 
preponderated against the court's finding and, as a case in 
equity, should be reversed by this court. The evidence showed 
that the second part of the document was written in blue ink, 
and not: in black as testified by Linda Cameron. The expert 
witness called by Robert Jones testified at trial that the 
second part of the document was not written by the same person 
who wrote the first part and that the inconsistencies and 
differences in the handwriting between the two parts could not 
be explained by natural variation typically present in a 
person's handwriting. 
Accordingly, Appellant Robert Lee Jones urges this 
Court to reverse the lower court and to remand it with 
instructions not to admit the document dated May 1, 1985, to 
probate as Herbert Lee Jones' last Will. In the alternative, 
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if this Court affirms the lower courtfs ruling that the 
document was in fact his last will, Robert Jones urges the 
court to hold that he is a pretermitted heir within the meaning 
of the Utah statute and that he is entitled to his intestate 
share of the Estate. 
ADDENDUM 
Petitioner/Appellant Robert Lee Jones has appended 
hereto copies of the following documents: 
1. Document dated May 1, 1985, signed by Herbert Lee 
Jones. (Exhibit 1.) 
2. Lower Court's minute entry dated February 19, 
1986. (R. 93-94.) 
3. Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
(R. 110-13.) 
4. Formal Probate of Will and Appointment of 
Personal Representative. (R. 114-15.) 
DATED this V day of October, 1986. 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & McCARTHY 
R. Stephen Marshall 
Thomas E. Nelson 
By V^\^M^ 
Attorneys for Petitioner/Appellant 
Robert Lee Jones 
50 South Main, Suite 1600 
P. 0. Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 532-3333 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused four true and correct 
copies of the within and foregoing Brief to be hand delivered 
this If* day of October, 1986, to the following: 
Alan M. Williams 
Thompson & Williams 
9662 South State Street 
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THOMPSON & WILLIAMS / * * L / \ 4 F n I 
W. Paul Thompson (3244) ~ — - ~ — ^ Z * Z J 
Alan M. Williams (3478) 
Attorneys for Petitioner Linda Cameron 
9662 South State Street 
Sandy, Utah 84070 
Telephone: 562-2555 
( 
HLED IN CLERK'S OFFICL 
Salt Lake County Utah 
APR1S1SBB 
Duty Ctert 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF 
HERBERT LEE JONES, 
Deceased. 
/^TH&vbeb. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Probate No. P85-0736 
Judge Homer Wilkinson 
The above entitled matter came on regularly to be heard 
before the Honorable Homer Wilkinson, one of the Judges of the 
above-entitled Court, on the 10th day of February, 1986 at the 
hour of 9:00 o'clock A.M.. Petitioner Linda Cameron appeared 
personally and by her attorney, Alan M. Williams. Petitioner 
Robert Lee Jones appeared personally and by his attorneys, R. 
Steven Marshall and Thomas E. Nelson. Witness were sworn and 
testified; and the issues raised by the objection to Petitioner 
Linda Cameron's petition were argued by counsel orally and upon 
trial briefs. The Court does hereby make the following findings 




fF '< t 
-2-
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The testamentary instrument to which the petition 
relates is the decedent's last will. 
2. It was executed on May 1, 1985 by Herbert Lee Jones , 
the decedent, in West Covina, California. 
3* At the time of the execution, the decedent had the 
testamentary capacity to make a will. 
A. The will was drafted by the decedent's daughter, Linda 
Cameron. 
5. At the time of the drafting of the will, there was no 
confidential relationship between the decedent and his daughter 
Linda Cameron. 
6. The phrase "and to be executer and sole beneficiary to 
my estate" was added to an unsigned document on May 1, 1985 by 
the petitioner Linda Cameron. That phrase was added to the 
unsigned document in the presence of the deceased and witnesses. 
The deceased acknowledged and executed the document including 
the added phrase as his will in the presence of the witnesses, 
and he and the witnesses executed it in the presence of each 
other* 
7. The making of the will was not procured by the undue 
influence of any person. 
8. The language of the will without the aid of extrinsic 
evidence showed the intent of the decedent to intentionally omit 
his son, petitioner Robert Lee Jones from the will. 
t? u 
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9. Had the court considered the extrinsic evidence it 
leard, that consideration would have reinforced the showing of 
intent by the decedent to omit his son, petitioner Robert Lee 
Jones from the will* 
10. The court finds the other issues made by the pleadings 
in favor of petitioner Linda Cameron and against the petitioner 
Robert Lee Jones. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court makes the 
following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The will of the decedent, Herbert Lee Jones was 
properly executed and acknowledged by the decedent and the 
witnesses in each otherfs presence. 
2. The petitioner Robert Lee Jones should take no part of 
the estate by virtue of the provisions of Section 75-2-302(1), 
Utah Code Annotated. 
-3. The will was not procured by undue influence on the 
part of petitioner Linda Cameron. 
A. The objection of the petitioner Robert Lee Jones should 
be denied. 
5. The May 1, 1985 will executed by the decedent should be 
admitted to probate 





I hereby certifiy that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law was mailed to 
R. Steven Marshall and Thomas E. Nelson, attorneys for 
petitioner Robert Lee Jones, VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL, AND 
MCCARTHY, P.O. Box 45340, Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-45340, on 





THOMPSON & WILLIAMS 
W. Paul Thompson (3244) 
/ A l a n M. W i l l i a m s ( 3 4 7 8 ) 
A t t o r n e y s for P e t i t i o n e r Linda Cameron 
9662 South S t a t e S t r e e t 
Sandy, Utah 84070 
T e l e p h o n e : 562-2555 
FILED IN CLERK oOFHCE 
Salt Lake County, Utan 
A ^ l ^ ^ 
VHJH^ Coyote* 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF 
HERBERT LEE JONES, 
Deceased. 
FORMAL PROBATE OF 
WILL AND APPOINTMENT 
OF PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE 
Probate No. P85-0736 
Judge Homer Wilkinson 
The above entitled matter came on regularly to be heard 
before the Honorable Homer Wilkinson, on of the Judges of the 
above-entitled Court, on the 10th day of February, 1986 at the 
hour of 9:00 o'clock A.M.. Petitioner Linda Cameron appeared 
personally and by her attorney, Alan M. Williams. Petitioner 
Robert Lee Jones appeared personally and by his attorneys, R. 
Steven Marshall and Thomas E. Nelson. Witness were sworn and 
testified; and the issues raised by the objection to Petitioner 
Linda Cameronfs petition were argued by counsel orally and upon 
trial briefs. The Court having made its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, does hereby ORDER, ADJUDGE, and DECREE as 
follows: \ 





2. The objection of the petitioner Robert Lee Jones is 
denied. 
3. Linda Cameron is hereby formally appointed as the 
personal representative of the decedent, to act without bond. 
4. Upon qualification and acceptance, letters testamentary 
shall be issued to the said personal representative. .V'* 
•i 
_L , 1986. / 
BY THE COURT: ; 
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I hereby certifiy that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Formal Probate and Appointment of Personal 
Representative was mailed to R. Steven Marshall and Thomas E. 
Nelson, VAN COTT, BAVGLEY,. CORNWALL, AND MCCARTHY, P.O. Box 
45340, Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-45340, on this ~?H day of 
Hjui^ y » 1986 
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